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ABSTRACT 
 
The theory of the Resource Curse suggests that countries with high levels of 
natural resources are actually found to possess lower gross domestic products.  The 
source of this disparity is widely debated; however, this analysis suggests that the 
underlying force preventing such nations from taking advantage of their natural capital 
abundance is corruption within their economic and governmental systems.  In addition, 
the resource quality is examined to see that it too affects the ability of a nation to change 
such assets into a higher overall level of national wealth.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In determining a nation’s wealth, it would be reasonable to assume that the more 
natural resources a country possesses, the higher their gross domestic product (GDP) will 
be as a result of having more capital at their disposal.  This, however, has proven in the 
past to not be the case.  It has been found that there is actually an opposite effect, which 
has become known as the “resource curse.”  This theory suggests that countries with 
greater levels of natural resources will actually have lower GDP’s than those without or 
with very little.  Nigeria, for instance, has seen great declines in their per capita GDP in 
the past couple decades despite the fact that they have received several billion dollars in 
oil revenue. (Herringshaw, 2004) 
 There are, of course, exceptions to the theory.  Over the course of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, iron and coal were the basis for industrialization.  Having 
reserves of such materials was a way of enhancing a nation’s industrial capabilities, 
which meant higher growth rates and greater GDP’s.  Additionally, during the twentieth 
century, resource rich countries like Iceland and Norway experienced substantial growth 
after finding and exploiting natural resources, mostly consisting of oil. (Gerlagh and 
Papyrakis, 2003)  This is reason enough to believe that there is inefficient handling in the 
way the resources are garnered, distributed, traded, or sold, which is in turn leading to the 
curse.  Because the presence of resources alone cannot cause a lack of economic growth, 
there has to be an underlying force, something driving the disparity.   
The source of the phenomenon is widely debated.  However, I will test that 
corruption among officials and politicians is the main driving force behind economic 
2losses.  It is their responsibility to enforce a rule of law and code of conduct in order to 
ensure a fair system is implemented.  Without this, bribery and side payments, as well as 
other inefficient business practices become the norms for participating in everyday 
commerce.  Any sort of rents that would otherwise be obtained from the extraction of 
resources are absorbed into pockets of dishonest bureaucrats, preventing the economy 
from reaping the benefits of its natural wealth.    
I will examine the impact of corruption on the resource curse by determining if it 
is significant in a regression of variables known to affect a nation’s wealth on GDP per 
capita.   The Corruption Perception Index will be used as a measure of each country’s 
corruption level.  The effectiveness of each nation’s government, which is determined by 
its commitment to policies and its credibility in creating a viable political structure, will 
be another variable representing the level of inefficiency or corruption in each country. 
(World Bank 2004)  If these variables are in fact the cause for the resource curse, they 
should not only be significant in the regression, but change the coefficients on natural 
resources as well.  If they hold no merit in determining a nation’s GDP per capita the 
coefficients on each corruption measure can be expected to be statistically insignificant.  I 
will use this as a guide for seeking out the true political and social inefficiencies causing 
a country with more capital to actually be in a worse economic situation.  
 
LITERATURE SEARCH 
 
A vast array of research has been done in order to better explain the phenomenon 
of the resource curse and its implications.  Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005) examine 
another angle between resource abundance and the wealth of a nation by looking at 
various human welfare indictors as a substitute for GDP or economic growth.  These 
variables include life expectancy, the percentage of the population that is undernourished, 
and the percentage of people without access to safe water.  The data on resources are 
measured as a share of total exports in each country.  Using this to determine a nation’s 
natural resource level may have some significant discrepancies.  It assumes the country is 
an active exporter and fails to acknowledge that countries may be stockpiling varied 
amounts of resources at any given time, which implies an obvious fault in the results.  
Taking this possible data complication into consideration, they do find evidence that a 
negative correlation exists between natural resource levels and human welfare indicators, 
consistent with theory.  
 A different aspect of the curse and its effects are examined by Collier and 
Hoeffler (2005).  They test the link between natural resources and the number of civil 
wars within a country.  This, which is also very much a curse, does in fact prove to be 
significant, as there is a connection between a nation’s level of conflict and their 
possession of natural resources.  They measure natural resources by determining the 
average rents or profits made on the sale of resources, calculated by subtracting the 
average cost of extraction from the average world price, and then multiplying this by 
each nation’s level of extraction.  This omits the uncertainty of a country’s export 
4volatility in determining the value of their resources and because of this, it is also the way 
I measure each nation’s resource level.  
Norway’s economic acceleration beginning in the 1970’s, as a consequence of 
their finding oil, led Larsen (2005) to examine whether rich countries are immune to the 
resource curse.  He uses Norway’s growth cycle as a guide and determines that while 
they did experience a period of hastened development, which finally caught up to their 
neighbors and soon surpassed them, they eventually hit a slowing point leading to the 
possibility of the onset of the resource curse.  This, however, is not conclusive as it is 
fairly common for a nation to see an immediate boom with the addition of a new 
technology or source of capital and then slow back down to levels more comparable of a 
steady status.  There may also have been other factors leading to their halt in growth, 
such as a lag in other industries.   
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
Due to the fact that corruption can lead to so many inefficiencies in the business 
process, I believe that it has the most significant impact in the ability of a nation to 
convert its natural resources into financial growth.  I will, therefore, include this with 
other factors that influence a nation’s GDP in testing the effects of each variable and their 
importance.  The things that make up corruption will include the susceptibility of a 
country’s political and public sector to participate in bribes, as well as the transparency of 
various bureaucratic institutions.  
One factor affecting GDP used in the regression, besides corruption, is the level 
of education attained by the citizens of each nation.  A higher quality of human capital, as 
measured by how educated employees are, leads to more innovation on the part of the 
worker, which turns into greater rents for the country.  If a nation is not willing to invest 
in the education of its people, they will surely be succumbed to low wage, labor intensive 
jobs, that are characteristic of lesser developed countries.  A country’s ability to 
participate in quick and efficient trade is another important indicator of their overall GDP.  
If an infrastructure is present that allows for goods to easily flow and for people to 
capitalize on any possible gains from trade, this will surely affect the potential of a nation 
to enjoy higher levels of national income. 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
Each of the theoretical aspects is implemented into a mathematical regression 
formula to show the exact effects between the variables and a nation’s GDP per capita.  
This model will also illustrate the significance of the variables and the strength of their 
relationship with per capita GDP.  By testing several functional forms including log-log, 
linear, and linear-log, the most efficient in developing the model and explaining the data 
is log-linear.  A graph of the residuals for the model in linear form, Figure 1, is a clear 
indication that there is a pattern, which is easily fixed by changing the dependent variable 
to log format.  
 
Figure 1: Residuals of Linear Model 
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7Transforming the regression to a log-linear form, not only corrects the 
misspecification error, but it is also much more conducive to the data, as the natural log 
of GDP per capita makes the distribution of the variable more narrow and limits the 
effect of any outliers.  Figure 2 shows this plot. 
 
Figure 2: Residuals of Log-Linear Model 
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The regression equation that will be used is: 
 
lngdpcap = 
1 + 
2cpiscore + 
3goveffectiveness + 
4literacy + 

5RoadPer100 + 
6paved + 
7resource + e 
 
Here, lngdpcap is the natural log of the per capita GDP of each nation measured 
in dollars.  cpiscore is the Corruptions Perceptions Index score that each country received.  
It is expected that the coefficient on this variable will be positive, as a higher score means 
less corruption and, therefore, a greater expected per capita GDP.  Another variable 
encompassing corruption is goveffectiveness, which is the shown by a combination of 
8quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
policies.  More effective policymakers should ensure that rents from resources are being 
successfully distributed back into the economy and will, therefore, make this variable 
positive if in fact corruption decreases GDP.   
 Literacy represents the literacy rate of each country.  Because it is an indicator of 
education levels, this is expected to be positive in building the wealth of a nation.  
Measures of infrastructure are given by RoadPer100, which is the kilometers of road per 
100 people, and paved, which is the percent of these roads that are paved.  A well 
developed infrastructure allows for an easier flow of goods and in turn, it is expected that 
these will have positive coefficients as well.  resource is an indicator for a country’s 
level of natural resources, and because of the theory of the “resource curse” we will 
expect the coefficient on this to be negative.  
DATA 
 
The data used in the regression is cross sectional, as each variable is recorded per 
country for a given year.  The variable lngdpcap is the natural log of per capita GDP 
(purchasing power parity) and is measured for 155 countries in dollars, taken from 2005.  
The maximum value was 11.04, which was Luxembourg and the minimum value was 
from Malawi at 6.39.  The changes in per capita GDP’s are fairly steady, with no large 
gaps, making neither of these an outlier.  cpiscore is measured for each country on a 
scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the most corrupt and 10 being the least.  Corruption is 
assessed through a number of data sources and country experts, including business 
leaders within their own country and outside it, who look at the frequency and size of 
bribes in both the political and public sectors and then give an evaluation.  The scores 
used in this data set are from 2005 and have an average across the 159 countries of 4.07. 
In order to determine whether the political environment in a nation is conducive 
to efficient practice, I use the variable goveffectiveness. This is observed for the year 
2004.  It is found using 352 variables drawn from 32 sources and 30 different 
organizations including, “surveys of individuals or domestic firms with first-hand 
knowledge of the governance situation in the country,” as well as “perceptions of country 
analysts at the major multilateral development agencies”, and “other data sources from 
NGOs and commercial risk rating agencies.” (Worldbank 2004)  The scale is a percentile 
rank from 1 to 100, with a mean of 49.37.  The 20 most and least corrupt countries 
according to these variables are given in Table 1.   
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Table 1: Most and Least Corrupt Countries 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Country              goveffectiveness  Country               cpiscore 
Switzerland 99.5 Iceland 9.7 
Singapore 99.5 New Zealand 9.6 
Iceland 99 Finland 9.6 
Denmark 98.6 Denmark 9.5 
Luxembourg 98.1 Singapore 9.4 
Finland 97.6 Sweden 9.2 
New Zealand 97.1 Switzerland 9.1 
Netherlands 96.6 Norway 8.9 
Norway 96.2 Australia 8.8 
Canada 95.7 Austria 8.7 
Australia 95.2 United Kingdom 8.6 
Sweden 94.7 Netherlands 8.6 
United Kingdom 94.2 Luxembourg 8.5 
United States 93.8 Canada 8.4 
Austria 93.3 Hong Kong 8.3 
Belgium 92.8 Germany 8.2 
Hong Kong 92.3 United States 7.6 
Ireland 91.3 France 7.5 
France 90.4 Belgium 7.4 
Germany 88.5 Ireland 7.4 
: :
Tajikistan 12.5 Indonisia 2.2 
Eritrea 12.5 Ethiopia 2.2 
Paraguay 12 Cameroon 2.2 
Angola 11.5 Azerbaijan 2.2 
Congo  11.1 Kenya 2.1 
Zimbabwe 10.6 Pakistan 2.1 
Burundi 9.1 Paraguay 2.1 
Afghanistan 9.1 Somalia 2.1 
Sudan 8.2 Sudan 2.1 
Chad 7.7 Tajikistan 2.1 
Cote D'Ivoire 7.2 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2.1 
Sierra Leone 6.3 Angola 2 
Turkmenistan 5.3 Cote D'Ivoire 1.9 
Equatorial Guinea 4.8 Equatorial Guinea 1.9 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 4.3 Nigeria 1.9 
Iraq 3.4 Turkmenistan 1.8 
Myanmar 2.9 Myanmar 1.8 
Liberia 1 Haiti 1.8 
Haiti 0.5 Bangladesh 1.7 
Somalia 0 Chad 1.7 
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Literacy is measured as the percentage of the population over the age of 15 who 
can read and write.  The data is gathered from the year 2003 and ranges from Niger at 
17.6% to 100%, which includes Finland, Luxembourg, and Norway.  It is evident from 
the average of 82.63% that Niger lays far outside the norms for most countries.  In fact, 
almost every country under the 50% mark is in an African or Middle Eastern nation.   
The kilometers of roadway in a nation and the percent of roads that are paved are 
indicators of the eminence of each country’s infrastructure.  RoadPer100 is measured as 
the kilometers of total roads per 100 people and paved is the percentage of those roads 
that are paved.  While it may seem that there would be a high correlation between the two 
variables, because they both deal with roadways, the correlation matrix in Table 2 shows 
that they are actually not that closely related.  RoadPer100 shows how easy it is to 
access the roads, based on the number of people using them, and will in turn indicate 
their convenience and ease of use in transporting goods.  Therefore, along with paved,
these will provide two useful measures, one representing quality and the other quantity of 
each nation’s infrastructure.   
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix (RoadPer100, Paved) 
________________________ 
 
| Road~100    paved 
-------------+------------------ 
 RoadPer100 |   1.0000 
 paved |   0.2360   1.0000 
 
_________________________ 
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In order to measure natural resources, I use the variable resource.  This includes 
energy based (coal, crude oil, and natural gas) and mineral based (tin, gold, lead, zinc, 
iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate) resources.  It is calculated using the 
following formula: 
 
production volume * average market price * (unit world price-average cost)
unit world price 
This essentially takes the world price per unit of each resource, subtracts the 
average cost of extraction and divides by the world price to determine the ratio of rents 
that should be received from the sale of a unit of each resource.  This is then multiplied 
by the world price, as well as the production volume in each country, to determine total 
rents from the resources.  Quantities and prices are found through multiple sources 
including the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, British 
Petroleum, International Energy Agency, International Petroleum Encyclopedia, national 
sources, United Nations, World Bank, and the Mineral Yearbook (2005).     
The values are then computed as a percent of the nation’s Gross National Income.  
They are recorded for the year 2000; however, updates have been made through 2003.  
The maximum is 182.7, which is from Turkmenistan.  They may be one of the best 
examples of corruption’s effect on the resource curse, as they have a CPI score of only 
1.8 and their per capita GDP is a mere $5900.  This makes it apparent, at least in their 
case that higher corruption does coincide with lower GDP’s.  A graph of resources 
against GDP per capita is shown by Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Resources, GDP Per Capita 
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
R
es
ou
rc
e
0 20000 40000 60000
GDP Capita
 
It indicates that there is a negative relationship between resource rents and each 
nation’s GDP.  Due to the fact that there are a fairly large amount of nations who produce 
no natural resources at all, there are a reasonable number of zero’s in the data for this 
variable, which is also shown by the graph.  Turkmenistan is an evident outlier; however, 
it has no significant effect on the regression when it is dropped, versus when it remains in 
the data.  Therefore, it will continue to be included in the figures and model.  
Table 3 provides all statistics for each variable used in the model in greater detail.
-Turkmenistan 
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Table 3: Data Summary Statistics 
_________________________________________________________
Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
 lngdpcapita |       155    8.697624    1.191567    6.39693   11.04612 
 resource |       149    8.187248    20.50371          0      182.7 
 cpiscore |       159    4.077987    2.178481        1.7        9.7 
goveffecti~s |       158    49.37722    29.21709          0       99.5 
 literacy |       156    82.63333    19.80649       17.6        100 
 RoadPer100 |       157    7.384306    8.949911   .2638329   47.13631 
 paved |       134    50.29701    33.88296         .8        100 
 
_________________________________________________________
There are some possible implications with the data that should be recognized.  
The variables cpiscore and goveffectiveness run the risk of measurement error, as they 
are both based on non-concrete valuation techniques.  Their measures are determined by 
people’s perceptions, which can be rather ambiguous.  While there are many factors that 
go into making sure each is highly accurate, there is still some possibility for error.  
 I do, however, believe that the formula being used to measure resource levels will 
have some positive effects on the results as it accounts for actual extraction levels, the 
monetary value of the commodity, and its cost for extraction.  By not using resources as a 
percent of exports, like many studies do, there leaves no discrepancy between countries 
whose policies limit trade, or those who simply choose to keep most of their product 
domestic. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The first regression run does not include the corruption variables, cpiscore and 
goveffectiveness, in order to provide a means of comparison when they are later added.  
Table 4 gives the results of this regression.  All variables are significant and have the 
expected sign except resource, which is negative as predicted, but insignificant. 
 
Table 4: Corruption Omitted 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     127 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,   122) =   56.11 
 Model |  107.559951     4  26.8899877           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 Residual |  58.4638151   122  .479211599           R-squared     =  0.6479 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6363 
 Total |  166.023766   126  1.31764894           Root MSE      =  .69225 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 lngdpcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 resource |  -.0024059   .0028256    -0.85   0.396    -.0079993    .0031876 
 literacy |   .0207023   .0041305     5.01   0.000     .0125255    .0288791 
 RoadPer100 |   .0390945   .0079991     4.89   0.000     .0232595    .0549296 
 paved |   .0123317   .0022357     5.52   0.000     .0079059    .0167574 
 _cons |   6.030403   .2789382    21.62   0.000     5.478217    6.582589 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Because heteroskedasticity or rather, the presence of a non-constant variance can 
alter standard errors, this could be causing resource to be insignificant. Therefore, the 
Breusch-Pagan test is run and it achieves the following results: 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
 Ho: Constant variance 
chi2(1)      =     3.17 
 Prob > chi2  =   0.0748 
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This indicates that the null hypothesis should be rejected in favor of 
heterokedasticity.  In order to correct this I use weighted least squares, which creates a 
constant variance by accounting for the discrepancies in observations and weighing those 
with high variances less.  The dependent variable being per capita provides some insight 
about the distribution of the variance and, therefore, I use country population as a weight.  
This regression is shown in Table 5.  In addition, it is run with robust standard errors. 
 
Table 5: Corrected Heteroskedasticity-Corruption Omitted 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
Number of obs =     127 
 F(  4,   122) =   61.56 
 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 R-squared     =  0.7754 
 Root MSE      =  .50936 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 | Robust 
 lngdpcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 resource |  -.0088773    .005286    -1.68   0.096    -.0193415    .0015869 
 literacy |   .0249765   .0034893     7.16   0.000     .0180692    .0318839 
 RoadPer100 |   .0673569   .0130762     5.15   0.000     .0414713    .0932425 
 paved |   .0100321   .0022649     4.43   0.000     .0055486    .0145157 
 _cons |   5.870775    .228855    25.65   0.000     5.417734    6.323817 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
By correcting for heteroskedasticity, all variables are now statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level.  Literacy, RoadPer100, and paved all have the forecasted signs 
and indicate that increasing the percent of a country’s population over 15 that can read 
and write by one, will raise GDP per capita by an average 2.4%, holding all other 
variables constant.  RoadPer100 has a fairly large coefficient revealing that when all else 
is held constant, increasing roadways by one kilometer per 100 people in the nation’s 
17 
 
population, will raise per capita GDP by 6.7% on average.  Resource is now significant 
at the 10 percent level and has the expected negative sign showing that raising the percent 
of national income that comes from resource rents by one, will decrease GDP per capita 
by an average .8%.  This seems small considering that to increase the share of a nation’s 
income coming from resource rents by even one percent would require significantly more 
resources; therefore, one would think that the curse would have a greater effect on GDP..  
Table 6 includes the corruption variable cpiscore and goveffectiveness to determine their 
effect on GDP and the curse.  
 
Table 6: Corrected Heteroskedasticity-Corruption Included 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Number of obs =     127 
F(  6,   120) =   58.10 
 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 R-squared     =  0.8544 
 Root MSE      =  .41352 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 | Robust 
 lngdpcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 resource |   .0021003    .005187     0.40   0.686    -.0081696    .0123702 
 cpiscore |    .144168   .0490725     2.94   0.004     .0470077    .2413282 
goveffecti~s |    .014234   .0041438     3.44   0.001     .0060296    .0224384 
 literacy |   .0187555   .0032385     5.79   0.000     .0123435    .0251674 
 RoadPer100 |   .0282861   .0118166     2.39   0.018       .00489    .0516823 
 paved |    .003892   .0020721     1.88   0.063    -.0002106    .0079946 
 _cons |     5.5503   .2435856    22.79   0.000     5.068017    6.032582 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
By adding cpiscore and goveffectiveness, we can now examine the impact of 
corruption on per capita GDP, as well as its significance in the resource curse theory.  In 
this model, literacy still has a positive coefficient.  However, it is smaller, as are the 
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coefficients on RoadPer100 and paved. Because leaving out variables creates bias, 
which in this case is upward, there was more weight given to the variables before the 
corruption factors were added, over inflating their values in the regression with the 
omitted variables.   Each of these variables continues to remain significant.  Literacy is 
still significant at the 1% level, while the infrastructure variables are now significant only 
at the 5% level.  Cpiscore and govefectiveness, both have the forecasted signs indicating 
that a nation who increases government effectiveness by one percent will raise their per 
capita GDP by 1.2%, holding all other variables constant and that increasing a country’s 
CPI score by one point will on average raise their GDP per capita by 15%.   
What is most interesting about this regression, however, is the change in the 
coefficient on natural resources.  Not only is it now insignificant, but it has a positive sign, 
as well.  This suggests that corruption is a considerable factor when looking at the 
resource curse and when accounted for, it may even cause an opposite effect than the 
theory suggests.  That is, holding corruption variables constant, increasing resource may 
increase a country’s per capita GDP.  Before corruption was taken into account, the 
resource curse seemed to be present, but once they are added into the regression resource 
loses all significance.  
 Table 7 gives a correlation matrix between the corruption variables and natural 
resources, showing that there is in fact a negative relationship between them. When a 
country has a high level of government effectiveness and greater CPI score, indicating 
less corruption, they have a lower amount of natural resources.  This could, therefore,  
illustrate that natural resources actually promote corruption and will be further examined  
in later sections. 
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix (Cpiscore, Goveffectiveness, Resource) 
 ______________________________________________ 
 
| cpiscore goveffectiveness  resource 
 -------------+-------------------------------------
cpiscore |   1.0000 
 goveffectiveness |   0.8909        1.0000 
 resource |  -0.2130       -0.2563      1.0000 
 
________________________________________________ 
 
The corruption indices added another element to the model, which was better at 
explaining GDP per capita than some of the other variables, and caused a significant 
alteration in the results.  The correlation matrix between cpiscore and gdpcapita in Table 
8 gives even more evidence that if a nation is to fully capitalize on its resources, whether 
they are natural or human, what matters is effective and efficient policy.  At .833, the two 
come very close to a correlation of one, which indicates a very close relationship. 
 
Table 8: Correlation Matrix (Gdpcapita, Cpiscore) 
______________________________ 
 
| gdpcap~a cpiscore 
-------------+------------------         
gdpcapita |   1.0000 
cpiscore |   0.8333   1.0000 
 
______________________________ 
 
Overall, this regression has a fairly high R2 meaning that the variables provide a 
good explanation for the amount of change in GDP per capita fluctuations.  Its value does, 
however, suggest that there are undoubtedly other factors accounting for GDP growth.  
The value of the F-Test for the parameters has a high value as well, clarifying that all 
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variables together hold an especially high level of significance.  The R-squared along 
with the F-Test figures are given in Table 9 below: 
 
Table 9: R-Squared and F-Test Statistics 
___________________ 
 
Number of obs =     127 
F( 6, 120) =   58.10 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.8544 
 
___________________
DATA ALTERATIONS 
 
In order to further solidify these results, some alternative variables have been 
tested in the regression.  Rather than using Roadper100 as a measure for the 
infrastructure, which again is the kilometers of roadways per 100 people in a country, 
rdpersqkil is entered in its place.  This variable differs in that it accounts for 
infrastructure by computing the ratio of kilometers of roadways to square kilometers of 
land area for each nation.  The comparison of results between each of the variables is 
given in Table 10.  In all of the regressions, the endogenous variable being regressed 
upon remains lngdpcapita. The t-stats are shown in parenthesis below the coefficient, 
with an asterisk representing significance at least the 10% level. 
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Table 10: Comparing Infrastructure Measures 
 _____________________________________________ 
 
Resource -0.0088 -0.0107 0.0021 0.0021 
 (-1.68)* (-1.69)* (0.4) (0.4) 
Cpiscore  0.1441 0.2225 
 (2.94)* (3.16)* 
Goveffeciveness  0.0142 0.0134 
 (3.44)* (2.69)* 
Literacy 0.0249 0.0371 0.0187 0.0199 
 (7.16)* (7.16)* (5.79)* (7.06)* 
Paved 0.01 0.008 0.0038 0.0032 
 (4.43)* (2.74)* (1.88)* (1.38) 
Roadper100 0.0673  0.0282  
 (5.15)*  (2.39)*  
Rdpersqkil  0.2741  -0.0096 
 (3.25)*  (-0.1) 
Constant 5.8707 5.2345 5.5503 5.4119 
 (25.65)* (19.04)* (22.79)* (23.96)* 
 
_____________________________________________ 
 
From this analysis, it is apparent that the difference in ratios between roadways 
per population and roadways per land area does not make a great enough impact on the 
results to change the variable or alter any conclusions about previous results.  The 
coefficients on resource and the corruption variables are almost identical between the 
two, as is there significance level.  For this reason, Roadper100 will continue to be used 
in further analysis. 
 Another possible data specification error that should be taken into account is the 
gross domestic product (GDP) versus gross national income (GNI) differential embedded 
into the resource variable.  Again, resource is found using the formula 
production volume * average  market price * (unit world price-average cost)
unit world price 
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This value is then taken as a percent of each country’s GNI and regressed on the nation’s 
per capita GDP, which seems contradictory.  To correct for this, a new variable 
resourcegdp has been created by taking each nation’s resource value, multiplying it by 
their GNI in 2000, which is when the resource data was compiled, and then dividing by 
their 2000 GDP.  This changes resource from being a percent of GNI to a percent of 
GDP.  The comparison of the two regressions is given in the table below: 
 
Table 11: Resource Gross Domestic Product 
____________________________ 
 
Resource 0.0021  
 (0.4)  
resourcegdp  0.0038 
 (0.73) 
Cpiscore 0.1441 0.1458 
 (2.94)* (2.99)* 
goveffeciveness 0.0142 0.0147 
 (3.44)* (3.51)* 
Literacy 0.0187 0.0184 
 (5.79)* (5.77)* 
Paved 0.0038 0.0036 
 (1.88)* (1.75)* 
Roadper100 0.0282 0.0282 
 (2.39)* (2.36)* 
Constant 5.5503 5.551 
 (22.79)* (22.67)* 
 
______________________________ 
 
These variables are again regressed up lngdpcapita and it is evident that there is 
no significant difference in the coefficients between the two.  Therefore, while this 
variable may again be considered in future regressions, it does not appear that the GDP 
versus GNI differential is something that merits a lot of concern.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
The idea that there could actually be a positive relationship between a country’s 
resource level and its GDP needs some more examination.  Different resources possess a 
wide variety of values and potential revenues for countries.  For this reason, it is 
important to observe how certain assets affect a nation’s income when they are broken 
down.  The variable resource has, therefore, been divided up into two different sects as 
previously mentioned.  One of which is energy and includes coal, crude oil, and natural 
gas, while the other, mineral, includes tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, 
bauxite, and phosphate.  Table 12 and 13 show how this breakdown of resource affects 
the regressions, both with and without the corruption variables.   
 
Table 12: Resource Broken Down Without Corruption 
 __________________________________________________________ 
 
Number of obs =     127 
 F(  5,   121) =   53.02 
 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 R-squared     =  0.7765 
 Root MSE      =  .51021 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 | Robust 
 lngdpcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 energy |   -.0088649   .0053766    -1.65   0.102    -.0195093    .0017794 
 mineral |   -.0608604   .0771357    -0.79   0.432    -.2135709    .0918501 
 literacy |    .0252294   .0033934     7.43   0.000     .0185112    .0319476 
 RoadPer100 |    .0668666   .0125634     5.32   0.000     .0419941    .0917392 
 paved |    .0098103   .0023411     4.19   0.000     .0051755    .0144451 
 _cons |    5.882252   .2281134    25.79   0.000     5.430642    6.333863 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Table 13: Resource Broken Down With Corruption 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Number of obs =     127 
 F(  6,   120) =   56.02 
 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 R-squared     =  0.8566 
 Root MSE      =  .41218 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 | Robust 
 lngdpcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 energy |   .0022873   .0052943     0.43   0.667     -.008196    .0127706 
 mineral |  -.0712347   .0528851    -1.35   0.181    -.1759525    .0334831 
 cpiscore |   .1367249   .0473166     2.89   0.005     .0430334    .2304165 
goveffecti~s |   .0149483   .0040542     3.69   0.000     .0069205     .022976 
 literacy |   .0190931   .0031372     6.09   0.000     .0128812     .025305 
 RoadPer100 |   .0281801   .0114025     2.47   0.015      .005602    .0507582 
 paved |   .0034915   .0021488     1.62   0.107    -.0007634    .0077463 
 _cons |   5.558716   .2379214    23.36   0.000     5.087608    6.029824 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
By breaking up the resource variable, there has been a decrease in the level of 
significance on these coefficients.  Therefore, addressing the regression in this way 
appears to be inefficient in analyzing the effect of different types of resources on a 
nation’s domestic product, as it provides no additional meaningful insight.  Another 
approach, however, can be taken by valuing each type of resource (mineral and energy) 
as a percent of the individual country’s total resource level, rather than each type in terms 
of an absolute value.   
For this, the amount of mineral based resources in the nation is divided by the 
country’s total national resource extraction and is represented by the variable permineral.
The same is done for energy and will be given by perenergy. In Table 6, which was the 
original regression that included the corruption variables, resource is insignificant.  
Using each type of resource calculated as a percent of a nation’s total level will provide a 
proxy for the quality, based on price value, of resources in each country.  Due to the fact 
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that energy based resources have a higher monetary value, nations with a large percent of 
these materials will possess a high quality resource base.  The two variables, permineral 
and perenergy, are run separately along with the variable resource for this regression to 
see if accounting for the nation’s quality of resources affects its significance in impacting 
per capita GDP.  The results are given in Table 14 and also include the regressions with 
the variable resourcegdp in place of resource.
Table 14: Mineral and Energy as a Percent of Total Resources 
 ____________________________________________ 
 
Permineral -0.4566  -0.4431  
 (-2.32)*  (-2.22)*  
Perenergy  0.4566  0.4431 
 (2.32)*  (2.22)* 
Resource -0.0024 -0.0024   
 (-0.43) (-0.43)   
Resourcegdp  -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (-0.12) (-0.12) 
Cpiscore 0.1592 0.1592 0.1586 0.1586 
 (2.79)* (2.79)* (2.76)* (2.76)* 
goveffeciveness 0.0124 0.0124 0.0132 0.0132 
 (2.73)* (2.73)* (2.82)* (2.82)* 
Literacy 0.0203 0.0203 0.0199 0.0199 
 (5.78)* (5.78)* (5.72)* (5.72)* 
Paved 0.0016 0.0016 0.0014 0.0014 
 (0.76) (0.76) (0.65) (0.65) 
Roadper100 0.0246 0.0246 0.0249 0.0249 
 (2.34)* (2.34)* (2.32)* (2.32)* 
Constant 5.7449 5.7449 5.2892 5.2892 
 (20.55)* (20.55)* (19.31)* (19.31)* 
 
_________________________________________________ 
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The coefficients on perenergy and permineral are both significant in their 
respective regressions and have opposite signs.  When a nation has a high quality 
resource level they seem to be exempt from the curse, as shown by the positive 
coefficient on perenergy. resource and, when used, resourcegdp are both insignificant. 
Using them in the regressions does not seem to change the results between each, again 
reiterated the results from Table 11 that there is not a results changing difference between 
resource and resourcegdp. Corruption is being held constant in each of these cases, so 
that the effect of the resource quality can be examined solely.   
What is known is the Dutch Disease is a similar theory, which suggests that the 
reason countries with more natural resources have lower GDP’s is because the high 
amount of resources devalues other goods within that country.  This happens when the 
discovery of natural resources increases the value of that country’s currency and makes 
products manufactured within that nation less competitive with the rest of the world.  
This causes imports to rise and exports to fall, thereby affecting the real exchange rate.  
To test this hypothesis, as an alternative to the idea of corruption as the main cause of low 
GDP’s, a regression is performed that includes each country’s real exchange rate as an 
exogenous variable.  This variable is known as realxrate and the results are given in 
Table 15, again lngdpcapita is what is being regressed upon.   
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Table 15: Dutch Disease and Real Exchange Rate 
____________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
In each case the coefficient on real exchange rate is insignificant.  The only 
regression which it seems to have an effect on resource is in the one that does not 
include the corruption variables or resource percentages.  In this case the coefficient on 
resource is now insignificant, which may indicate that there is in fact a working effect of 
the Dutch Disease on a nation’s GDP.  Overall, however, realxrate does not appear to be 
as substantial a factor as corruption when explaining the effects of natural resources on a 
country’s GDP, as it leaves most resource variables insignificant. 
After each of these possible data changes are tested, the quality of resources 
seems to have the most results altering effect when added to the original regressions.  
One of the most valuable and covetable resources today is oil, as it largely affects the 
Realxrate -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (-1.04) (-1.03) (-0.13) 
perenergy  0.4494  
 (2.10)*  
resource -0.0084 -0.0116 0.0022 
 (-1.54) (-1.93)* (0.43) 
cpiscore  0.1476 
 (2.97)* 
goveffeciveness  0.0139 
 (3.34)* 
literacy 0.0251 0.0257 0.0188 
 (7.13)* (7.10)* (5.82)* 
paved 0.0098 0.0062 0.0037 
 (4.31)* (2.61)* (1.81)* 
Roadper100 0.067 0.0639 0.0278 
 (5.07)* (5.11)* (2.36)* 
constant 5.9172 5.7344 5.5608 
 (25.02)* (20.13)* (22.17)* 
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daily lives of most societies.  It is possible that a nation in possession of large amounts of 
this asset may reap huge financial benefits despite the quality of their government or the 
level of corruption within the society and will, therefore, be further examined
. THE EFFECTS OF OIL AS A RESOURCE 
Recent decades have bared witness to richer, more developed countries finding oil, 
which may lead to a skew in the data in favor of these economies.  In the late 1970’s the 
United States opened pipelines in Alaska and in the mid 1970’s the North Sea came 
online. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany all have 
some stake in the North Sea oil findings. This would reiterate a positive relationship 
between national incomes and resources as both locations encompass developed, high 
GDP nations.  In order to see if there may in fact be a difference between such resources, 
I have generated an additional variable oilper1000, which is each nation’s oil production, 
measured in thousands of barrels per day.  Table 16 gives this regression. 
 
Table 16: Oil Production 
______________________________________________________________ 
Number of obs =     131 
 F(  6,   124) =  147.80 
 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 R-squared     =  0.8765 
 Root MSE      =  .38125 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 | Robust 
 lngdpcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 oilper1000 |   .0000822   .0000151     5.45   0.000     .0000524     .000112 
 cpiscore |   .1423043   .0413363     3.44   0.001     .0604883    .2241203 
goveffecti~s |   .0141998   .0041827     3.39   0.001     .0059212    .0224785 
 literacy |   .0161595   .0030642     5.27   0.000     .0100946    .0222244 
 RoadPer100 |   .0179733   .0079815     2.25   0.026     .0021756    .0337709 
 paved |   .0047995    .002106     2.28   0.024     .0006312    .0089679 
 _cons |   5.671184   .2445896    23.19   0.000     5.187072    6.155295 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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Again, even when accounting for corruption, oilproduction has a positive and 
significant coefficient.  While this coefficient is very small, indicating that increasing a 
country’s oil production by 1000 barrels per day will raise its per capita GDP by .008 
percent holding all other variables constant, it is still opposite of what the resource curse 
suggests.  This reiterates the idea that if a nation has a government in place which can 
implement effective policy, such as the United States, Iceland, and Norway, citizens can 
in fact be beneficiaries in the presence of natural resources.   
In addition, those that have found the resource curse to be an actual phenomenon, 
such as Neumayer (2004);  Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005); and Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2004), all use data from the early 1970’s before the opening of Alaska and the 
North Sea.  They also differ in their dependant variables which are growth in genuine 
income from 1970-1998, human development indices, and gross savings respectively.  
Each of them fails to measure the GDP per capita of each nation, which indicates the 
actual wealth being held by that economy during a current point in time.  This allows us 
to see how each nation has used their resources, and if they have been able to implement 
advantageous policies in decades leading up to the current, which would provide them 
with higher GDP’s.   
There has also been a drastic increase in the world price of oil since the early 
1970’s.  This may have had additional affects on the amount of rents that nations received 
as compared to the data used in the above analyses pre-mid 1970’s.  Figure 4 shows the 
average world pricing trend in 2006 dollars of crude oil from 1947 to 2006 marking the 
beginning of North Sea oil and Alaskan oil coming online by the spike in the late 1970’s.  
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In addition, the price has drastically risen again since 2000, which is when the data for 
this analysis was collected.   
 
Figure 4: Crude Oil Price Changes 
 
(WTRG Economics)
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The regression results indicate that the resource curse has the potential to not be a 
curse at all if resources are efficiently extracted and traded in a competitive market, 
absent of bad dealings or crooked behavior.  Certain countries, Iceland and Norway, have 
proved this as well, by showing it is possible for benefits to be had from the discovery of 
what is essentially natural wealth.  All that is required is a willingness to open one’s 
market up to the economy, while ridding it of corruption.   
What is not certain, however, is why resource rich countries are more prone to 
corruption to begin with, and what keeps it there.  There are a couple explanations that I 
have formed to explain this.  Political figures who actively engage in corruption create 
what becomes a vicious cycle.  By exploiting rents that should be distributed or invested 
throughout the country, they are able to gain financial power, which it turn, allows them 
to control the system.  This includes keeping the nation’s economy from becoming 
transparent, an essential part of regulating corrupt practices.  The people, who have no 
infrastructure or education system because their officials will not invest in them, are left 
with no way out; no fair system to engage in business and no chance at higher wages.  
Violence or upheaval may seem the only possible solution, which is in fact known to be 
positively correlated with natural resource levels; however, both only leave the country in 
even more financial distress.  (Collier and Hoeffler) 
It appears to be up to outside parties to aid in ending the corruption.  The “Publish 
What You Pay” campaign, founded by several groups in 2002 including Transparency 
International and Global Witness had over 220 members in 2004 and mandates that 
34 
 
payments made to governments on a country to country basis be published.  Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, set up something similar in 2002 to aid in the creation of more 
transparency with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.  Both of which have 
been successful in bringing awareness to the issue, but pressure on countries where 
corruption is know to be prevalent, needs to continue to ensure that these leaders become 
accountable.  (Herringshaw) 
 It is evident that corruption plays a substantial role in the way resources are 
allocated and as a result, the financial success of a nation.  Being able to participate in the 
practices of commercial business without the burdens of bribery or bureaucratic injustice 
creates a system which can only enable economic growth.  By forcing corrupt practices in 
the economy, inefficiency is rampant and no one is better off except those taking the 
bribes, but in the long run even they will be unable to prosper.   
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